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Abstract 
This work will study the socio-demographic determinants, political, budgetary and 
economic, that affect the transparency of local entities. To perform the study, we have 
chosen the transparency index data for the 110 largest municipalities of Spain, in 2012 
has been chosen from the information offered by the website of the organization 
Transparency International Spain. The results indicate that the budget imbalance and 
population, influence an increase in the level of transparency. On the contrary, factors 
such as debt per capita, unemployment and provincial capital, affect a decrease in the 
level of transparency. In addition, through the evolution of the global index it has been 
possible to conclude that legislation on transparency and the organizational 
Transparency International Spain, have helped to stimulate the disclosure of the 
information from local governments. 
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Budget Transparency in Local Governments 
Paloma Giménez Perona 
 
1. Introduction 
 
From the perspective of the public sector, transparency is a very important 
requirement for governments, both local and central; to secure good public 
management1. Transparency provides information that promotes the understanding of 
policies and reduces uncertainty, which is sometimes caused by lack of information. 
Therefore, citizens can evaluate the performance of the activities carried out by public 
administrations. 
Transparency is gaining such importance that institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have established guidelines that governments must follow to obtain 
high levels of transparency. The IMF has created a code of good practices on 
transparency2, directed at monetary and financial policies of the budget process. It 
focuses on four pillars: I) the clarity of functions, responsibilities and objectives of the 
public sector in the economy, II) budget processes should be formulated and inform the 
public in all its phases, III) the availability of budget information which must meet the 
characteristics of easy understanding and be available to the public within a reasonable 
period and IV) accountability and assurances of integrity of budget information which 
must ensure data quality. The pillars should be useful and serve as a guide to 
policymakers to design their budget reports. If a country complies with this, we would 
that affirm, that it has the highest level of fiscal transparency and, therefore good public 
management.  
In this work, the importance of the third pillar for society is emphasized. This 
represents the public availability of budget information, that is, the justification of public 
activity which has to be performed. Starting from the availability of reliable data on  results, 
in which informs and give surrender account to citizens on the use of resources and the 
degree to which proposed policy are obtained. The study intends to focus on this, 
                                                          
1 Public management is defined as the application of all the processes and tools that the public 
administration has to achieve to reach the objective of development or welfare of the population. 
 
2 For purposes of the Code of Good Practices on Transparency, IMF manifests that transparency 
is the public disclosure of the objectives of a policy, legal, institutional and economic thereof, the 
decisions and the political foundations in an understandable, accessible and timely form. 
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because although politicians known exactly all the data of their  budget, this information 
is not provided to the citizen with complete accuracy. Sometimes, citizens have difficulty 
in knowing what their money has been assigned to, if the politician has used it for a good 
purpose or for the politician´s own use or purposes. 
 The lack of transparency is often associated with corruption3, especially at the 
local level, because as Prud'homme suggests (1995) it is more likely that politicians and 
local officials give in to pressure from interest groups. Also, usually, local politicians are 
more discreet when making decisions that national. Schick (2003) contends that electoral 
participation at the municipal level is lower, government activity is less transparent and 
there is an increased risk of corrupt activity. Sharman and Chaikin (2009) show that 
corruption is one of the major financial problems for most developing countries and is 
one of the biggest obstacles to economic growth. 
Studies by Transparency International Spain4, asserts that of the 176 countries 
ranked in the index of perception of corruption in 2012, which has a range from 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 100 (less corrupt), two thirds obtained a punctuation of less than 50. This 
indicates that corruption is an obvious problem which can be found day after day in our 
public institutions, and levels of transparency should be increased. Corruption has been 
at the center of a wide range of literature, authors like Blumkin and Gradstein (2002), 
Lindstedt and Naurin (2010), Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) indicate that an improvement 
in the levels of transparency reduces corruption.  
The study by Becker (1968) states that the probability of an individual being 
corrupt, depends on the risk assumed, the expected benefits and the probable sanction 
that could be attached. To reduce this risk Islam (2002) finds that laws, access and 
dissemination of information, reduces incentives the possibility that a politician is corrupt 
and increases the probability of being detected. This argument states, that greater 
transparency acts to decrease the moral hazard problem, since it is related to public 
control and this in turn, with less corruption. Finally, Mauro (1995), Olson, Sarna, and 
Swamy (2000), Meon and Wells (2005), suggest that if access to corrupt activities is 
                                                          
3 One definition of corruption is the “improper use of public office in exchange for private gain” 
(Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010).   
 
4  The  information is obtained the Transparency International: 
http://www.transparencia.org.es/IPC%C2%B4s/IPC_2012/Aspectos_m%C3%A1s_destacados_
IPC_2012.pdf 
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more difficult or it has a lower probability, there will be a higher level of transparency that 
improves governance facilitates the growth of economy, efficiency and development. 
As we have seen, despite transparency of public institutions being a very 
important topic, the literature is scarce in identifying the determinants that influence their 
level. Perhaps, this is because it is hard to know which is the best way to measure 
transparency, as it is a complex issue. This paper will examine how certain authors have 
studied the transparency by measuring it in different ways. Moreover, it is made clear 
that the knowledge of the factors that determine the levels of transparency, generate 
better procedures of managing the budget and wider divulgence of accountability. 
Accordingly, this work consists of carrying out an analysis of the determinants, socio-
demographic, budget, political and economic, of local governments transparency. To do 
this, the transparency index created by Transparency International Spain has been 
chosen, which has been applied to 110 of the largest Spanish municipalities in 2012. 
 The study is structured as follows. In section 2, a literary review of transparency 
in government. In section 3, the index of transparency created by Transparency 
International Spain is addressed. In section 4, the methodology used is specified. In 
section 5, the results of our empirical model for the rate of global transparency are 
analyzed and the six areas of government5 activity. Finally, section 6 summarizes the 
conclusions.  
 
2. Literature review on transparency in governments 
 
The growing demand for the surrender of national accounts established in recent 
years, means that transparency of public institutions, has a great importance both 
economically and socially. In the literature, studies on transparency are observed, but is 
still in the first phase of a long way to go, as it is evaluating the determinants of 
government transparency. This first phase is even more marked in the case of 
transparency of local governments, as currently there are not many studies that address 
this topic in depth.  
Political institutions play an important role in the levels of transparency, because 
they are in charge of the process of the budget report, which is one of the most important 
documents made by the government. In this budget, includes indicators such as deficit 
                                                          
5 Transparency International Spain has divided the global transparency index into six areas of 
activities by local government. 
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and public debt and where reconciled and implemented specific policy objectives are. Its 
formulation process consists of three phases at the central level: (1) The proposed 
budget is made by an executive, (2) Parliament approves and submits the budget, and 
(3) bureaucracy implements the budget. National voting procedures are very important 
for budgeting, because they establish when and who can influence it. 
With the process of budget formulation known. What does literature understand 
by budgetary transparency? Literature is extensive in this term. According to Poterba 
and Von Hagen (1999) it is when policy information provided in clear, consolidated and 
easy accessible manner for the public and the participants. Premchand (1993) defines 
budget transparency, as availability to the public of information on the operations and 
procedures carried out by politicians for making government decisions. Garrett and 
Vermeule (2006) divided budget transparency in two parts, (1) transparency is budget 
disclosure from which policymakers and the public should be informed in a clear, 
prominent and understandable method, (2) transparency can also refer to public 
decision-making for the approvals of budgets.  
Hood (2001) manifests that there are two theoretical approaches that explain 
budget transparency. The first approach is the theory of the rule of law, which believes 
the key to governance mandatory disclosure and transparent management. In this case, 
Spanish laws determine the minimum information that municipalities must disclose. The 
second approach is the principal-agent theory, which comes from the private sector and 
is linked to disclosure for better governance in the public sector. But this theory holds 
that governments do not have to follow the preferences of citizens, as they may have 
their own interests, which do not always maximize the welfare of society. 
Although politicians are those who should deliver a level of transparency in 
budget reports, many authors are not convinced they want to communicate all the 
information they have in their possession.. According to Benito and Bastida (2009) 
politicians have little incentive to formulate obligation of a clear, simple and transparent 
budget. They also show that governments should be under pressure to increase budget 
transparency and so provide citizens and financial markets with a correct performance 
evaluation together with the political situation. This would facilitate better decision-
making processes of economic agents. 
Moreover, Ball (2011) states that generally politicians do not want to support 
transparency in the same way as it is done in the private sector. In his opinion, 
governments lack the will to give a transparent information, because of major obstacles 
attributed to not providing adequate information, such as, constitutional restrictions and 
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legal or limitations of financial information. However, these obstacles do not affect the 
developed countries, because they have sufficient resources to be able to formulate their 
reports properly and provide a high level of quality in them. According to this author, the 
absence of willingness is due to two main elements: (1) the incentives that politicians 
have in the short term, are not closely related to social interest and (2) the current 
institutional agreements, such as elaboration of the budget, provide politicians with weak 
incentives to submit high quality and transparent reports. 
On the other hand, the following authors give the opposite view, Benito and 
Bastida (2009) and Ball (2011). According to Gigorescu (2003), the richest countries in 
terms of GDP per capita, are less concerned about the high costs involved in the 
collection, processing and provision of information in the budget. He concludes that the 
poorest countries are less transparent, as these costs can deter from procedures to 
adopt laws relating to transparency. This theory is also affirmed by Bastida and Benito 
(2007) with an empirical demonstration using the variable GDP per capita, they argue 
that increasing the wealth of a country is positively related to increased level of 
transparency in budget reports. 
Empirical studies on transparency in governments, both internationally and 
locally, can be classified into three groups, according to the source of information used 
to measure the level of transparency. In the first group, we can highlight the works of 
Guillamón, Rios and Vincent (2011), Guillamón et al. (2011a) and Albalate (2013), who 
use the information given on the website of the organization Spain Transparency 
International (TI-Spain), on the global level of transparency of public institutions. In the 
second group, we find the works of Serrano et al. (2008), Cárcaba and Garcia (2008), 
Jorge et al. (2011), Piotroswki and Bertelli (2010) and Polo (2011), who have created 
their own index of transparency through information given by the public administrations 
of each locality. Finally, the third group, is constituted by studies of Benito and Bastida 
(2009), Caamaño et al. (2011) and Alt and Lassen (2006), using information from 
organizations external control, as is the case of the IMF and OECD, they formulated 
transparency indices. 
In a study of the evolution of the transparency index in the biggest municipalities 
of Spain, since the year 2008-2010, Guillamón, Rios and Vicente (2011) show that 
municipalities governed by leftwing parties are more transparent than the right. The 
political strength and the unemployment rate are related negatively to the level of 
transparency, while total expenditure is positively related. Finally, it stresses that the 
most transparent municipalities receive a higher amount of financial resources. 
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Guillamón et al. (2011a), with data from the transparency index of the 100 largest 
municipalities of Spain, in 2008, state that the population of the municipality, transfers 
received and higher taxes have a significant and  positive impact on transparency. As for 
to political ideology, it shows that the leftwing parties are more transparent than the right. 
The debt variables, the electoral strength and participation of voters is not shown to be 
significant. 
Albalate (2013), with data from the transparency index of 2010, for the 110 largest 
municipalities in Spain, shows that the population positively influences the levels of 
transparency. He also claims that leftwing governments are more transparent than the 
right. The political strength, the provincial capital, unemployment and tourism, influence 
reduced levels of transparency. Budget variables, the voter participation and economic 
activity have no influential result. 
Serrano et al. (2008) conducted an empirical study considering all provincial 
capitals and municipalities that have more than 70.0000 inhabitants in Spain, in 2006. 
His sample was limited to a total of 92 municipalities, selecting financial information on 
their budgets and annual accounts. This study concludes, the existence of significant 
and positive influences between income per capita and population, as a result of greater 
disclosure of budget information. 
Moreover, Cárcaba and Garcia (2008) elected a sample of 334 Spanish 
municipalities with over 20,000 inhabitants. Data was collected from municipal web 
pages and examining aspects related to the amount, understandability and comparability 
of financial information published, in 2004. Their results show a positive relationship 
between transparency and the size of municipalities, political strength and the level of 
investment. The study concludes, that the development of notifications of digital 
information for the Spanish public in local areas, is in a phase of initiation.  
Jorge et al. (2011) from 49 Italian and 45 Portuguese municipalities, assess the 
level of transparency of local governments in each country in the middle of 2010. Their 
model asserts, that population variable is only significant in the case of Italy. Moreover, 
the voting participation variable is counterintuitive, because it has a negative impact on 
levels of transparency. 
Piotroswki and Bertelli (2010), created their own measure of municipal 
transparency starting from an investigation, by obtaining information from surveys on 
topics of local community and government performance, it carried out on 6,055 
inhabitants in New Jersey. Their empirical model shows the relationship between socio-
 7 
 
demographic, economic and institutional determinants. This study concludes that only 
the population level is positively related to transparency. A higher percentage of elderly 
inhabitants (over 65 years) in the population and the greater volume of the budget, are 
contrary to expectations, so they are related negatively. 
The research of Polo (2011) focuses on the creation of an index of fiscal 
transparency starting from the annual reports of the Audit Office of Cataluña6. Allowing 
you to know if the budget information for a given municipality, has been transmitted in a 
legal term and has been published for the general knowledge the citizenship. This index 
has been analyzed for 680 Catalan municipalities in the period 2001-2004. This study 
only evaluated the budget and policy variables. The result was that the political strength 
and debt per capita have a negative relation to transparency, while political participation 
is positively related. 
Benito and Bastida (2009) evaluate the level of transparency through the 
database World Bank Budget in 2003. It based on a survey in each country of the 
Organisation for Economic Coperation and Development, and in 30 countries that are 
not members, which provides information on almost 300 aspects of the budget. This 
empirical study is one of the first to evaluate the relationships that exist between the 
budgets of the countries, transparency, the fiscal situation and political participation in 
an international approach. The conclusions reached by this article are that transparency 
improves the commitment of politicians to be fiscally responsible and that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between political participation and transparency 
index. 
Moreover, Caamaño et al. (2011) designed a questionnaire based on 15 
questions7, starting from the revision of the International Monetary Fund Code of Good 
Practices on Fiscal Transparency (2007). The answers have a range from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The questionnaire was performed to measure budget 
transparency in 33 Galician municipalities in 2008. Their conclusions are that 
transparency has a negative relationship in coalition governments and unemployment. 
Debt has a positive impact with the transparency index. This contradicts the result that 
Polo (2010) specifies on the per capita debt. The answer offered to this contradiction is 
                                                          
6 Such information is presented through annual reports, which are public and can be consulted 
at: http://www.sindicatura.org/web/guest/Corporacions_Locals . 
 
7 For a better understanding, the questionnaire is in: Caamaño, Lago, Reyes and Santiago (2011) 
“Budget Transparency in Local Governments: An Empirial Analysis”, International Studies 
Program, Working Paper, 11, pp. 8 
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that governments tend to increase transparency, when there are higher debt and a lower 
deficits. Moreover, there are not significant variables in the level of transparency of the 
population size and electoral participation. 
Finally, Alt and Lassen (2006), use data taken from a questionnaire from the 
OECD in 1999, for 19 countries that were members in that year. The questionnaire only 
included data that was related to transparency, of the 76 items composing the 
questionnaire only 11 of them were incorporated. In his study, he incorporated 
implications to a model of three outcomes. Their results were that, to greater levels of 
transparency, less debt accumulation. But, an increased political participation, increases 
the accumulation of debt. Lastly, right-wing governments tend to have higher deficits than 
left. 
Table 1, shows a summary of the documents described in this section, where it 
indicates the sample, the variables used and the result obtained, whenever it is 
significantly related only to transparency. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3. The transparency index for local governments in Spain 
 
Transparency International Spain (TI-Spain) is a non-governmental organization, 
which in 2008 created the first index of transparency of local governments in Spain. 
Governments that make up this index are larger municipalities, those having more than 
65,000 population, which together account for more than half of the population of Spain. 
In the year of its creation this figure was 100 municipalities and in 2012 this figure 
increased by 10 municipalities more. 
Each municipality is assigned an individual score of transparency, with a range 
of 0 to 100 points, with 0 being a lower level of transparency and a higher level 100. The 
names of the 110 locations are shown in Table 2, together with their global index of 
transparency. As shown in the table, these indices are widely dispersed, as the 
municipality with the highest level of transparency has a rating of 100 and the lowest 
transparency has a rating of 15. 
[Table 2 about here] 
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With this index TI-Spain, tries to promote full disclosure methods, giving 
municipalities the opportunity to make information public. Where governments must 
strive to provide correct information, thus achieving a better public understanding and a 
higher level in the transparency index. To better understand how governments can 
increase their transparency index and what kind of efforts need to be made, it is 
necessary to explain the calculation of the index. 
This index is calculated by grouping 80 indicators in six areas (1) Information on 
the municipal corporation, (2) Relations between citizens and society, (3) Economic-
financial transparency, (4) Transparency in the procurement of services, (5) 
Transparency in urban planning and public works and (6) Indicators of the new Law on 
transparency. It is noteworthy, that this latter area was introduced in 2013, as Spain was 
one of the few countries that did not have a law on transparency and only takes into 
account countries with more than one million inhabitants. This affected all levels of 
government, because governments were not required to provide citizens with information 
on their decision-making processes or their activities. 
For information of the 80 indicators, TI-Spain made an appraisal of a previously 
completed a questionnaire, with a score for each municipality. . Taking into account the 
municipality questionnaire of the previous year, the organization can incorporate new 
information in the report if it appears on the website of the municipality. Or it may be the 
case that once the assessment by TI-Spain is completed and the questionnaire is sent 
to each of the 110 municipalities, it wants to add new information in the report, or not 
include new data, approval can be given. TI-Spain may verify the information at any time, 
because municipalities are required to report where they are located on the questionnaire 
data. If a municipality adds information on any of the 80 indicators, its level of 
transparency will increase. A summary of this survey along with the distribution of the 80 
indicators, can be found in the table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In previous years, the questionnaires that municipalities did were subject to for 
four different types of punctuation, but the organization TI- Spain wanted to simplify this 
aspect. Therefore since 2012 there are only two types of ratings for each of the 80 
indicators that make up the index of transparency, this score is: 
1) 1 POINT: If the information of the indicator evaluated is published in the web 
page of the town hall. 
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2) 0 POINTS: If the information of the indicator evaluated is not published in the 
web page of the town hall. 
In graph 1, the differences and evolution from the year 2008 to 2012, are 
observed between the indexes of transparency of five areas. The indicator from the new 
transparency law has been excluded, as it was incorporated in the year 2012, therefore 
presents no evolution. 
[Graphic 1 about here] 
 
The evolution of index of transparency areas, shows information for the period 
2008-2010. As can be observed, the index that has obtained a minor growth, it is the 
index of transparency on the municipal corporation. This low growth, is because at the 
date of its creation (2008), it had a high level of transparency (70 points), compared to 
other areas, causing that the evolution to be slow so that by the year 2012, it had 
increased only 3.7%. This area seeks to inform on elected officials and staff, the 
organization and the heritage and the rules of municipal institutions. 
The rate of economic-financial transparency, in 2012, was one of the lowest 
indicators and was located just above the index of transparency in the procurement of 
services, the one which presented the highest growth of its index. In the year 2008, it 
was the lowest rate of all areas with 29 points, and in 2012, it managed to obtain a score 
of 71 points. This index, it gives accountable and budgetary information, on income, 
expenses and municipal debts. 
Finally, in 2012 a new indicator was incorporated, that it evaluates the area of the 
new transparency law. It reports on the planning and organization, contracts, 
agreements, grants and charges of the town hall, investees and on economic and 
budgetary information. Although not shown in the graph, this area is placed in the 
assessment with a score of 57.4 index points.  
On the other hand, by way of example, we can see if TI-Spain’s purpose to 
promote disclosure has been met in recent years. In graph 2 is evaluated the evolution 
of the average global transparency index from the first year of its inception (2008) until 
the last year that the index has been published (2012). 
[Graphic 2 about here] 
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In this graph, we can see that the annual increase has followed the global 
transparency index, it has not been steady, if not decreased. Producing the following 
increments: year 2008-2009 a 22.84%, year 2009-2010 a 9.69% and finally year 2010-
2012 a 1%. This may be due to the fact that in the first year global transparency index 
had 52.1 points, so that governments made great efforts to raise the index. Thanks to 
these efforts, in 2010, global transparency index rose to 70.2 points in position. In this 
respect we can say, that is high index, has caused governments to spend increasing 
effort and difficulty to increase levels of transparency, reaching only an increase of 1% 
in the last period. 
If we compare the transparency index in 2008 and 2012, we see that there has 
been an increase of 36.08%, so with this data we can conclude that TI-Spain’s purpose 
to promote the dissemination of information, has been fulfilled. The transparency index 
has increased in recent years, from the date of its creation an index of 52.1 points 
compared to 70.9 points published last year (2012). 
 
4. Sample description of the variables and methodology 
 
 In this empirical analysis, first we will examine the determinants of the overall 
index of transparency of local governments.  Also, to realize the same empirical model 
for the six areas that TI-Spain assesses in order to evaluate how the factors of each of 
these areas are affected. Before carry out this analysis, the dependent variable and the 
independent variables will be defined. 
 
4.1. Sample and description of variables 
 
The dependent variable used for this study is the transparency index. Our sample 
has been obtained from the index of transparency of local Governments carried out by 
TI-Spain, in the year 2012, evaluating the 110 largest municipalities of Spain. According 
to the literature, the factors that determine the transparency of Governments are varied. 
The factors that affect the transparency of the local governments will be identified. In this 
study we will include the variable of socio-demographic, budgetary, political and 
economic natures. 
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The first group are the socio-demographic variables, which is made by the 
population of each town, the percentage of participants in the municipal elections of each 
locality, and if a municipality is a provincial capital or not. The second group consists of 
the budgetary variables, made up of debt per capita, per capita taxes and budgetary 
imbalance of each municipality. The third group, comprises political variables, which 
made up of political ideology, that is, if a government leader is right-wing or left-wing, 
and by the strength of the leader. Finally, the fourth group are the economic variables, 
which are formed by the unemployment rate and broadband lines. Below, in table 4 each 
variable of this study is defined and the signal of the results expected.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Socio-demographic variables 
Population: (log_population) is the logarithm of the size of a city described in number of 
inhabitants (thousands).The literature has shown, that this variable is positively 
correlated with the level of transparency. According to Bastida and Benito (2007), a 
larger population in the municipality positively affect the transparency.  
Capital: (capital) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the municipality is a 
provincial capital and the value of 0 otherwise. Since in the capitals, there are a greater 
number of organizations of the public administration, we want to examine whether the 
capital factor, has a level of significance and observe how this variable affects the 
transparency index. According to Albalate (2012), the capitals of provinces are an 
obstacle to increasing the degree of transparency. 
Turnout: (turnout) is the percentage of participation of each municipality in the last local 
elections. This variable is an indicator of the interest that citizens have with the policy of 
its municipalities. The expected result is ambiguous, since the empirical models of 
literature, are not clear in this aspect. Jorge et al. (2011) stated that the relationship 
between transparency and the percentage of participation have a negative sign, which 
was not expected. While Polo (2011) determines that a greater participation in elections 
induces a greater level of transparency. 
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Budget variables 
Budget imbalance: (budget_imbalance) is the budget surplus, it is calculated from the 
ratio between the total expenses and total revenue of the municipality. A positive 
relationship between this variable and transparency of governments is expected. 
Debt: (debt_percapita) is the debt of a municipality that each inhabitant pays. It is 
calculated from the annual debt the population of a municipality has. The expected result 
is ambiguous, since there are several opinions in this regard. According to Alt and 
Lassen (2006) and Alt et al. (2006), a lower transparency is associated with a greater 
debt issuance. On the contrary, Caamaño et al. (2011) argues that to the greater the 
debt, the higher the level of transparency that local governments offer. 
Taxes: (taxes_percapita) are the municipal taxes collected per inhabitant. It is calculated 
from the yearly taxes the population of a municipality has. Authors like Guillamón (2011a) 
defend empirically that the municipalities that attribute more taxes to its inhabitants, 
reveal a higher level of information, so they are more transparent. 
 
Political variables 
Left-wing ideology: (left_mayor) is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the local 
government belongs to the party of the left and 0 in the opposite case. With this variable 
we want to assess whether there is a significant relation to transparency and political 
ideology. Albalate (2012) shows that left-wing parties who lead the local government, are 
associated with higher levels of transparency. 
Left majority: (left_mayority) is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the party 
leader of the Government is on the left and enjoys an absolute majority. That is if more 
than 50% of the elected councilors are left-wing in government that is leading in that 
municipality. In the case that another party enjoys an absolute majority, it will be given 
the value of 0. This variable identifies the Governments on the left who do not need 
agreements with other political parties to govern in its municipality. Alt et al. (2006) argue 
Governments with less political strength, increase levels of transparency to a greater 
extent than when a party governs with absolute majority. 
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Economic variables 
Broadband: (broadband_percapita) is the number of broadband lines the inhabitants of 
a municipality has. 
Unemployment: (unemployment) is the unemployment registered in a municipality that 
is measured by the percentage of the population potentially active. Guillamón et al. 
(2011a) empirically, shows that the municipalities that have high unemployment rate 
have a low level of transparency. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
Our regression model, shows the analysis of the degree of fulfillment of the 
determinants relating to the rate of transparency of local governments with the variables 
described above, so our regression model is: 
 
Transparencyi = ßo + ß1 Log_population + ß2 Capital + ß3 Turnout +  
                          ß4 Budget_inmbalance+ ß5 Debt_percapita + ß6 Left_mayor + 
   ß7 Left_mayority + ß8 Broadband_percapita + ß9 Unemployment + 𝜀i 
 
For the estimation of the determinants of transparency Tobit model has been 
used. This model allows the calculation of the effects of each of the variables on the level 
of transparency. The dependent variable is censored, between 0 and 100, since they 
represent the highest and lowest score that a transparency index can have. Table 5, 
represents the descriptive statistics for the set of independent variables used in the study. 
This includes the average, median, maximum and minimum and standard deviation. 
[Table 5 about here] 
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5. Results 
 
 Table 6, distributes the factors that affect the index of transparency in four 
categories, socio-demographic, budget, political and economic These estimates have 
been made with the Tobit model, which shows the effects that the variables have on the 
probability of an increase or decrease in the level of transparency. While, table 7 shows 
the estimated results for each of the six categories of transparency, from the same model. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
 
5.1. Results of the global transparency 
 
 First, we will analyze the results shown in the table 6. Our empirical study on the 
socio-demographic factors, determines that all variables have a significant effect on 
transparency. In particular, it is noted that the municipalities with the largest populations, 
tend to enjoy a higher level of transparency. This result coincides with the work of 
Guillamón et al. (2011a). The authors indicate that the influence of the population in the 
transparency index, may be due to two reasons (1) transparency needs an adequate 
infrastructure, which implies that they are in locations with a greater number of 
inhabitants and (2) large municipalities get more public funds and consequently face 
greater pressures to inform on them. 
 Focusing on the variable capital, as expected, it is negatively related to the 
transparency index. This result is also confirmed by Albalate (2012), who argues that the 
provincial capitals have a lower level of transparency. This is because, these types of 
cities have a greater presence of public administrations, which represent an obstacle to 
their own levels of transparency. As a result, a greater number of administrations, 
economic resources and political power in these places, are significantly higher, 
regardless of the size or the local economy. 
 Regarding the variable of the participation of citizens in the voting, the results 
coincide with Jorge et al. (2011), who showed that the voter participation negatively 
affects levels of transparency. This fact can be explained from the abstentions, since a 
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higher level of these has a positive influences on making local governments put more 
efforts to disseminate the information. 
If we look at the budget variables, we observe that the budget imbalance is 
associated positively with transparency index, that is, as a government have a higher 
level of spending or lower revenue, it will have greater pressure from society to be more 
transparent. On the other hand, despite the different conclusions which gives the 
literature on debt per capita. Our study confirms the results of Alt and Lassen (2006), Alt 
et al. (2006) and Polo (2010), and shows that has a significant and negative relationship 
with transparency, i.e., to higher levels of debt, governments offer us lower levels of 
transparency. Therefore, when in government there is a greater level of debt per capita, 
the information they offer is lower than those with lower levels of debt. 
Political variables, unlike in other studies, is not relevant in the determination of 
the index of transparency in this study. Therefore it is not possible to affirm theories such 
as that of Ferejonh (1999), who argued that the left-wing governments, increase levels 
of transparency, because they want a broader public sector. Neither can the conclusions 
of Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) be supported who argue that the left-wing parties 
are more transparent than the rights, because the former worry more about facilitating 
access to information. But we agree with Polo (2010) who argues the appearance of 
political ideology was not significant in their empirical study. Further to political ideology, 
is the political strength, in which our result can not verify the conclusions of Guillamón, 
Ríos and Vicente (2011), who show, that stronger political governments are less 
transparent than the divided governments. 
Finally, in terms of economic variables it is observed that the unemployment 
variable is the only significant variable. Provides in our study one of the most relevant 
results, it has a very high level of significance (1%) and presents the expected sign. This 
result confirms to Guillamón et al. (2011b)8. The conclusion is that the municipalities with 
a higher rate of unemployment show a low rate of transparency, in comparison to 
municipalities with lower unemployment rates. Unemployment is an indicator of the local 
economy and, therefore, better economic situation tends to increase the levels of 
transparency index.  
 
                                                          
8 Gillamón et al. (2011b) affirms in their study that the unemployment rate affects the levels of 
transparency negatively. 
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5.2. Results of transparency in the six areas 
 
 Moving onto the results of table 7, in which we have evaluated how transparency 
is affected in to the six segments or activities, which are attributed to the local 
government. With this, we want to justify the efforts made by TI-Spain to create an index 
of transparency for each area9. 
 The first area is the information about the municipal corporation. The results show, 
that with higher population levels, transparency levels are greater in this index. This is 
due to the fact that, the greater number of inhabitants exerts more pressure for the 
disclosure of information. On the other hand, in the provincial capitals transparency 
levels are lower and also are in municipalities where there are high levels of 
unemployment. 
 The second area, tells us about the relations between the citizens and society. In 
this segment, only socio-demographic and economic variables have influence. The 
population affects positively in the transparency levels, while the participation of citizens 
in the voting and unemployment affect negatively these levels. 
 The third area is the economic- financial transparency. Our results are consistent 
with Albalte (2013), where the budget variable, such as debt or the budget imbalance 
variables are not significant for this area. Moreover, only unemployment and the 
provincial capitals are meaningful and affect the transparency level in a negative way 
with the transparency index. This is because unemployment is a measure of the 
economy of the municipality, and the capital cities of the provinces tend to decrease their 
level of transparency. In the latter case, the transparency economic-financial, decreases 
by 15 points, representing the largest decrease in transparency which lies in our 
estimates with respect to this variable. 
 The fourth area is that of service engagements. According to our empirical results 
we conclude, only the variable of the unemployment affects in a negative way.. As we 
have said before, this is because the unemployment variable reflects the economic 
situation of each municipality.  
 The fifth area is that of urban planning and public works. This area affects a larger 
number of variables so it is the most sensitive. The level of transparency is influenced 
                                                          
9 For more information, in the table 3 of this document, the characteristics are displayed which 
evaluated in each of the areas in which the results obtained will be described. 
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negatively by unemployment, capital debt and participations of citizens in voting. By 
contrast, the budget imbalance affects positively.  
 The sixth area, is the new transparency law. Our results show that a larger 
population and a greater budget imbalance, influence positively the increase in levels of 
transparency. While unemployment and the capitals of the provinces are related in a 
negative way. 
 Finally, we will highlight the most important factor, unemployment affects all 
indexes in six areas and global transparency index. It has a negative influence with a 
high level of significance, between 1% and 5%. This is because, at present in Spain the 
unemployment rate presents a great importance in our society. Spain has the second 
highest unemployment rate in the European Union, although in the last year it started a 
reduction of this rate, ahead of Portugal, Germany and Poland. On the other hand, if we 
compare the male unemployment rate with the European Union, it is observed that it is 
highest in Spain. In Spain it stands at 11.7% against that the European Union which 
stands at 10.4%. Estimates by the Organization for Trade and Development in Spain, 
the recovery is weak and slow and the unemployment rate will hardly fall in 2014 and 
2015. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 The main objective of this study has been to analyze the socio-demographic, 
budgetary, political and economic factors that have an influence on the levels of 
transparency at the local level. The size of the sample used consists of 110 Spanish 
municipalities, with more than 65,000 inhabitants, in 2012. In terms of methodology, we 
have used the Tobit model because the dependent variable is censored between 0 and 
100. This range represents the transparency level of each municipality, with 0 being a 
lower level of transparency, and 100 higher level.  
 According to our results, the only demographic variable that has a positive 
relationship with transparency is the population, the other two remaining, provincial 
capitals and voting participation presented a negative influence on the index of 
transparency. The latter being, a counterintuitive sign. The justification for this result is 
that less political participation in a municipality, influences in a negative way, causing a 
stimulus to local governments to offer more information to its citizens. 
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 In terms of budgetary variables, the budget imbalance presents a positive 
correlation, in that higher levels of expenditure or lower revenue, mean a higher index of 
transparency. On the other hand, per capita debt relates negatively, that is, to higher 
levels of debt, less transparency. This is because politicians with greater levels of debt 
politicians provide less information in order to try to "hide" some data and thus not give 
a bad image to citizens or simply to avoid having to give explanations on certain aspects. 
In our study, as in other works such as Polo (2010), the political variables are not 
statistically significant. Finally, the only economic variable that influences the level of 
transparency, is the level of unemployment. This affects the level of transparency, in a 
very significant way having a negative relationship. So, the higher the unemployment the 
lower the transparency index will be. Unemployment is one of the biggest problems 
currently in Spain, presenting a difficult solution for government. For this reason, the 
Government in 2012, has adopted measures established in the Official State Bulletin10, 
on the protection of part-time workers and other urgent social and economic measures. 
If these adjustments achieve a reduction in the level of unemployment, this would 
contribute to a higher level of transparency by local governments. 
As we have seen in this document, the TI-Spain organization has managed to 
achieve the dissemination of public information. But this is only the beginning of a long 
way to go, as there are currently many obstacles that block access to information, and 
therefore this means that there is a limited number of municipalities to assess. This 
limitation arises, because the access to the information in the majority of municipalities 
is not as efficient as could be expected. They have to evolve and start making the most 
of the opportunities offered by new technologies. 
On the other hand, in our study we have evaluated the segmentation of the index 
of transparency in six areas, because it serves to have a better understanding of the 
effect on the variables in these segments. For example, in the area of economic-financial 
transparency, the cities that are capitals of provinces and unemployment show a 
negative relationship with transparency index. Although this approach is relevant to 
understand in greater depth the determinants of each index of transparency, it would be 
interesting if in future more studies are undertaken that will facilitate the understanding 
of the obstacles and determinants with respect to transparency. 
                                                          
10  The measures are established in OE-A-2013-8556, its link is: 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/08/03/pdfs/BOE-A-2013-8556.pdf 
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Finally, it would also be beneficial in the future to analyze the index of 
transparency of all Spanish municipalities, in order to achieve two goals: (1) even more 
comprehensive analysis of the determinants that affect the level of transparency and (2) 
a greater promulgation. 
 
  
 21 
 
 
References 
 
Albalate, D. (2012) “The Institutional, Economic and Social Determinants of Local       
Government Transparency”. Research Institute of Applied Economics, 10, pp. 1-30. 
 
Albalate D. (2013) “The Institutional, Economic and Social Determinants of Local  
Government Transparency”. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, pp. 1-19 
 
Alt, J.E., and Dreyer, D. (2006) “Fiscal Transparency, Political parties, and Debt in OECD 
countries”. European Economic Review, 50, pp. 10 – 28. 
 
Alt, J.E., Lassen, D.D. and Rose, S. (2006) “The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: 
Evidence from the American States”, IMF Staff Papers, 53, pp. 30-57. 
 
Ball, I. (2011) “New development: Transparency in the public sector”. Public Money & 
Management, 32, pp. 35-40. 
 
Bastida, F. and Benito, B. (2007) “Central government budget practices and 
transparency: an international comparison”. Public Administration, 3, pp. 667-716. 
 
Benito, B. and Bastida, F. (2009) “Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and 
Political Turnout: An International Approach”. Fostering Fiscal Responsibility: 
International, Federal, and Local Government Perspectives, pp. 403- 417. 
 
Besley, T. (2004) Principled Agents? Motivation and Incentives in Government. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Blumkin, T. and Gradstein, M. (2002) Transparency Gloves for Grabbing Hands? Politics 
and (Mis) Governance, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3668. 
 
Caamaño, J., Lago, S., Reyes, F. and Santiago, A. (2011) “Budget Transparency in Local 
Governments: An Empirical Analysis”. International Studies Program, Working 
Paper, 11, pp. 1-30 
 
Cárcaba, A. and García, J. (2008) “Determinantes de la divulgación de información 
contable a través de Internet por parte de los gobiernos locales”. Revista Española 
de Financiación y Contabilidad, 137, pp. 63-84. 
 
Garrett E. and Vermeule, A. (2006) “Transparency in the Budget Process”. Legal Studies 
Working Paper Series, 6, pp. 1-32. 
 
Grigorescu, A. (2003) “International Organizations and Government Transparency: 
Linking the International and Domestic Realms”.  International Studies Quarterly, 47, 
pp. 643 – 667. 
 
 22 
 
Guillamón, M.D., Bastida, F. and Benito, B. (2011a) “The determinants of local 
governments’ financial transparency”. Local Government Studies, 37, pp.  391-406. 
 
Guillamón, M.D., Benito, B. and Bastida, F. (2011b) “Evaluación de la deuda pública 
local en España”. Revista española de financiación y contabilidad, 150, pp. 251-285. 
 
Guillamón, M.D., Rios A.M. and Vicente C. (2011) “Transparencia financiera de los 
municipios españoles. Utilidad y factores relacionados”. Auditoria pública, 55, pp. 
109-116. 
 
Hood, C. (2001) “Transparency”, in P.B. Clarke and J. Foweraker, Encyclopedia of 
Democratic Thought, pp. 700–705 . 
 
Jorge, S., Moura, P., Pattaro, A.F. and Lourenço, R.P. (2011) “Local Government 
financial transparency in Portugal and Italy: a comparative exploratory study on its 
determinants”. Conferencia Bianual CIGAR conference, Belgium, 9–10 June 2011. 
 
Lindstedt, C. and Naurin, D. (2010) “Transparency is not Enough: Making transparency 
effective in Reducing corruption”. International Political Science Review, 31, pp.301-
321. 
 
Peisakhin, L. and Pinto, P. (2010) “Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? 
Evidence from a field experiment in India”. Regulation and Governance, 4, pp. 261-
280. 
 
Pietrowsky, S. and Bertelli, A. (2010) “Measuring municipal transparency”, 14th 
International Research Society for Public Management conference Bern. 
Switzerland on 1rst April, 2010. 
 
Polo J. (2011) “Analysis of fiscal transparency determinants for Catalan municipalities”. 
Revista de economía del Caribe, 8, pp. 133-166. 
 
Poterba, J. and Von Hagen, J. (1999) “Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance”. 
National Bureau of economic research, .pp. 17-186 
 
Premchand, A. (1993) “Public Expenditure Management”. Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund. 
 
Prud’Homme, R. (1995) “On the dangers of decentralization”. World Bank Research 
Observer, 10, pp. 201-220 
 
Schick, A. (2003) “The performing state: reflection on an idea whose time has come but 
whose implementation has not”. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 3, pp. 70–103. 
 
Serrano, C., Rueda, M. and Portillo, P. (2008) “Factors Influencing e-Disclosure in local 
Public Administrations”. Documento de Trabajo 2008-03, Universidad de Zaragoza. 
 
 23 
 
Sharman, J.C. and Chaikin, D. (2009) “Corruption and anti-money-laundering systems: 
putting a luxury good to work”. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions, 22, pp. 27–45. 
 24 
 
Table 1. The transparency of public administrations  
Authors Sample Variables Results 
Guillamón, Rios and 
Vicente (2011) 
Index of transparency of the 100 largest 
municipalities in the period 2008-2010. 
Political ideology (left) Positive 
Political strength  Negative 
Unemployment rate Negative 
Expenditure Positive 
Guillamón et al. (2011) 
Index of transparency to 100 municipalities, in 
2008. 
Population Positive 
Taxes Positive 
Political ideology (left) Positive 
Received transfers Positive 
Albalate (2013) 
Index of transparency to 110 municipalities, in 
2010. 
Population Positive 
Political ideology (left) Positive 
Political fortress Positive 
Province capital Negative 
Unemployment rate Negative 
Tourism Negative 
Serrano et al. (2008) 
92 capitals of provinces with over 70,000 
inhabitants, in 2006. 
Population Positive 
Income per capita Positive 
Cárcaba and García 
(2008) 
334 Spanish municipalities with over 20,000 
inhabitants, in 2004. 
Population Positive 
Political strength  Positive 
Investments Positive 
(Continued) 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Jorge et al. (2011) 
49 Italian municipalities and 45 Portuguese, in 
2010. 
Population Positive 
Voting participation Negative 
Piotroswki and Bertelli 
(2010) 
6,055 people in New Jersey. 
Population Positive 
Elderly population Negative 
Budget Negative 
Polo (2011) 680 Catalan municipalities, in the period 2001-2004. 
Political strength  Negative 
Debt per capita Negative 
Voting participation Positive 
Benito and Bastida 
(2009) 
Index transparency for OECD member countries 
and 30 non-members, in 2003. 
Political participation Positive 
Caamaño et al. (2011) 33 Galician municipalities, in 2008. 
Political strength  Negative 
Unemployment rate Negative 
Debt per capita Positive 
Alt and Lassen (2006) 19 OECD countries. Debt per capita Negative 
Source:  Prepared
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Table 2. Municipalities contained in the 2012 TI survey 
  
Local government 
Transparency 
index Local government 
Transparency 
index 
Alcobendas 100 Santa Cruz de Tenerife 76 
Bilbao 100 Ourense 75 
Gandía 100 Cádiz 75 
Gijón 100 Chiclana de la Frontera 75 
Oviedo 100 Badalona 74 
Ponferrada 100 Parla 74 
Sant Cugat del Vallès 100 Castellón de la Plana 74 
Torrent 100 Reus 73 
Burgos 99 Manresa 73 
Albacete 98 Palma de Mallorca 73 
Barakaldo 98 Valladolid 71 
Getxo 98 Tarragona 68 
Mataró 98 Coslada 66 
Murcia 98 El Ejido 65 
Puerto de Santa María 98 Marbella 65 
Madrid 96 Vigo 65 
Avilés 96 Cornellà de Llobregat 63 
Sabadell 96 Fuenlabrada 63 
Málaga 95 Pontevedra 61 
Santa Coloma de Gramenet 95 Majadahonda 60 
Sant Boi de Llobregat 94 Cuenca 60 
Alcorcón 94 Guadalajara 60 
Pamplona 94 Lorca 59 
Roquetas 93 Las Rozas 58 
Soria 93 Pozuelo de Alarcón 56 
Terrassa 93 Sevilla 56 
Vélez-Málaga 93 Orihuela 56 
Alcalá de Henares 93 Sagunto 54 
Arona 91 Cartagena 53 
León 91 Salamanca 53 
Móstoles 90 Alicante 53 
Torrejón de Ardoz 90 Jerez de la Frontera 51 
San Sebastián-Donostia 90 Ávila 49 
Barcelona 89 San Fernando 48 
Palencia 89 Córdoba 46 
Rubí 89 Leganés 44 
Fuengirola 89 Toledo 40 
Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 89 Alcalá de Guadaíra 38 
Lérida 89 Cáceres 35 
   (Continued) 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Logroño 88 Dos hermanas 35 
Segovia 88 San Cristóbal de la Laguna 34 
Lugo 86 Benidorm 34 
Vitoria 86 Granada 34 
Zaragoza 86 Almería 31 
Santander 83 Badajoz 30 
Torrevieja 83 Valencia 30 
Getafe 81 Algeciras 29 
A Coruña 81 Jaén 29 
Santiago de Compostela 80 Mijas 29 
Ferrol 79 Huelva 20 
Elche 78 Talavera de la Reina 20 
Hospitalet de Llobregat 78 Telde 18 
San Sebastián de los Reyes 78 Teruel 16 
Girona 78 Ciudad Real 15 
Source: Transparency Institutional Spain 
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Table 3. Indicators prepared by TI-Spain 
A) Information about the municipal corporation (17) 
1. Information about elected officials and staff (4) 
2. Information on the organization and heritage (8) 
3. Information on standards and municipal institutions (5) 
 
B) Relations between citizens and society (13) 
1. Information and citizen (7) 
2. Degree of commitment to citizenship (6) 
 
C) Economic-financial transparency (14) 
1. Accounting and budget (5) 
2. Transparency in income and municipal expenditures (5) 
3. Transparency in the debts municipal (4) 
 
D) Transparency in the procurement of services (4) 
1. Procedures of procurement of services (2). 
2. Relationships and operations with suppliers and contractors (2) 
 
E) Transparency in urban planning and  public works (17) 
1. Urban management plans and urban development agreements (4) 
2. Decisions on reclassification and urban development awards (2) 
3. Ads and tenders for public works (3) 
4. Information about concurrent, offers and resolutions (2) 
5. Monitoring and control of the execution of works (3) 
6. Indicators on urban planning and public works (3) 
 
F) Indicators of the new law of transparency (15) 
1. Planning and organization (2). 
2. Contracts, agreements and grants (6) 
3. Senior members of the city council and subsidiary entities (4) 
4. Economic information and budget (3) 
Source: Transparency International Spain  
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Table 4. Sample of the independent variables  
  
Variables Definition of variables Expected sign Source 
Socio-demographic 
variables 
Population  
Logarithm of the number of inhabitants municipal 
population. 
Positive 
National 
Institute of 
Statistics 
Capital 
Dummy variable: 1 - Capital province 
                            0 - Not capital province. 
Negative 
Ministry of 
Interior 
Turnout Percentage of the voters of a municipality. Ambiguous 
Budget variables 
Budget_imbalance Chapters 1 to 7 (ORN) / Chapters 1 to 7 (DNR) Positive 
Ministry of 
Economy and 
Finance 
Debt_percapita Chapter 9 (DRN) / inhabitants Ambiguous 
Taxes_percapita Chapter 1-3 (DRN) /inhabitants  Positive 
Political variables 
Left_Mayor 
Dummy variable: 1 - Local government left  
                            0 - Another party. 
Positive 
Ministry of 
Interior 
Left_Majority 
Dummy variable: 1 - Local Government of left and                              
with absolute majority  
                             0 - Absolute majority another 
party. 
Positive 
Economic variables 
Broadband_percapita Number of broadband in the municipality. Positive La Caixa Spain 
Economic 
Yearbook 
Unemployment 
Unemployment registered in % of the population 
potentially. 
Negative 
Note: ORN: Net recognized obligations 
          DRN: Net recognized rights 
Source: Prepare
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics  
  
            
Independents variables   Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Socio-demographic variables     
Log_population 5,142 5,075 0,314 4,554 6,51  
Capital  0,455 0 0,50021 0 1  
Turnout  0,618 0,632 0,07 0,465 0,752  
        
Budget variables       
Budget_imbalance 0,975 0,94 0,157 0,72 1,628  
Debt_percapita 228,45 115,9 322,82 -0,84601 1748,8  
Taxes_percapita 607,59 585,93 162,9 263,77 1246,5  
        
Polítical variables       
Left_mayor  0,081818 0 0,27534 0 1  
Left_majority 0,036364 0 0,18805 0 1  
        
Economic variables       
Broadband_percapita 0,266 0,268 0,041 0,177 0,37  
Unemployment 14,953 14,65 3,606 6,2 23,6  
 Source: Prepared 
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Table 6. Estimation of regressions 
        
Independent variable      Tobit 
Socio-demographic variables  
Log_population  14,352* 
   (7,339) 
Turnout   -65,095* 
   (37,983) 
Capital   -8,0347* 
   (4,528) 
Budget variables   
Budget_imbalance  29,814* 
   (16,609) 
Debt_percapita  -0,01622* 
   (0,00928) 
Political variabales   
Left_mayor   -4,64773 
   (10,2225) 
Left_majority  -0,8750 
   (16,6091) 
Economic variables   
Broadband_percapita  28,5657 
   (56,6422) 
Unemployment  -2,367*** 
   (0,661) 
    
N. Observation   110 
R²   - 
Wald Chi²     47,2209 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses. 
Note 2: Statistical significative at 1 %(***), 5 %(**), 10 %(*). 
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Table 7. Model Tobit, estimation of regressions for area 
Independent variables 
  
Corporate 
transparency 
Social 
transparency 
Economic 
transparency 
Contracting 
transparency 
Procurement 
transparency 
Law 
transparency 
Socio-demographic variables      
Log_population  15,7452** 24,2440*** 9,9379 11,1049 11,071 16,3916* 
  (7,9872) (7,4667) (12,6490) (16,9685) (7,1486) (9,8491) 
Capital  -11,3281** -1,0647  -13,9629* -5,4034 -4,6296 -11,7783* 
  (5,1502) (4,0877) (7,4433) (8,0835) (4,3266) (6,0142) 
Turnout  -64,2044 -57,6405* -72,5319 -72,4331 -82,0570** -62,0344 
  (40,7954) (32,0480) (73,2772) (63,7034) (36,4405) (50,0952) 
Budget variables        
Budget_imbalance  15,8019  21,5484 20,5058 54,1707  33,0836** 44,5100* 
  (20,5518) (15,5537) (32,5950) (39,7962) (15,2267) (24,5167) 
Debt_percapita  -0,0110  -0,0078  -0,0241 -0,0263 -0,0159** -0,0163 
  (0,0129) (0,0102) (0,01938) (0,0169) (0,0077) (0,0128) 
Taxes_percapita  -0,0044  -0,0047 -0,0237 -0,0036 0,0024 -0,000054 
  (0,0194) ( 0,0160) (0,0301) (0,0270) (0,0146) (0,0232) 
Political variables        
Left_mayor  -7,5882 5,2913 -12,2045  -20,0782  0,1644 -2,9342 
  (11,139) (11,7801)  (24,8488) ( 18,6013) (10,0002) (14,0184) 
Left_majority  5,2387 -3,1804 -4,3971 16,9516  -1,7815 -9,2267 
  (18,5049 ) (18,6224) (29,2057) (31,9529) 15,0913 (22,4158) 
(Continued) 
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Table 7. (Continued) 
Economic variables      
Broadband_percapita 25,9792 6,1823 63,0980  -52,6757 40,5465  53,0611 
  (62,6729 ) (53,7550) (99,1248) (102,963) (50,5576) (74,7817) 
Unemployment  -2,3962*** -1,8781*** -4,5199*** -2,8262** -1,5220** -2,4747** 
  (0,7443) 0,7075 1,4945 1,2903 0,6213 (1,0806) 
        
N. Observation   110 110 110 110 110 110 
Wald Chi²   0,0689 48,2571 82,1469 95,9131 44,3475 51,4649 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses. 
Note 2: Statistical significative at 1 %(***), 5 %(**), 10 %(*). 
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Graphic 1. Evolution transparency index 
 
Source: Compiled from information TI-Spain. 
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Graphic 2. Evolution global transparency index 
 
Source: Compiled from information TI-Spain 
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